April 24,
1974
--------------------------------------
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT: Implications of
Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests
The President has directed
a study of the impact of world population growth on U.S. security and overseas
interests. The study should look forward at least until the year 2000, and use
several alternative reasonable projections of population growth.
In terms of each
projection, the study should assess:
- the corresponding pace of
development, especially in poorer countries;
- the demand for US
exports, especially of food, and the trade problems the US may face arising
from competition for resources; and
- the likelihood that
population growth or imbalances will produce disruptive foreign policies and
international instability.
The study should focus on
the international political and economic implications of population growth
rather than its ecological, sociological or other aspects.
The study would then offer
possible courses of action for the United States in dealing with population
matters abroad, particularly in developing countries, with special attention to
these questions:
- What, if any, new
initiatives by the United States are needed to focus international attention on
the population problem?
- Can technological
innovations or development reduce growth or ameliorate its effects?
- Could the United States
improve its assistance in the population field and if so, in what form and
through which agencies -- bilateral, multilateral, private?
The study should take into
account the President's concern that population policy is a human concern
intimately related to the dignity of the individual and the objective of the
United States is to work closely with others, rather than seek to impose our
views on others.
The President has directed
that the study be accomplished by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee,
is requested to forward the study together with the Committee's action
recommendations no later than May 29, 1974 for consideration by the President.
HENRY A. KISSINGER
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
December 10, 1974
CLASSIFIED BY Harry C. Blaney, III
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWN-
GRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
This document can only be
declassified by the White House.
Declassified/Released on 7/3/89
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by F. Graboske, National Security Council
1.
World Population growth since World War II is quantitatively and qualitatively
different from any previous epoch in human history. The rapid reduction in
death rates, unmatched by corresponding birth rate reductions, has brought
total growth rates close to 2 percent a year, compared with about 1 percent
before World War II, under 0.5 percent in 1750-1900, and far lower rates before
1750. The effect is to double the world's population in 35 years instead of 100
years. Almost 80 million are now being added each year, compared with 10
million in 1900.
2.
The second new feature of population trends is the sharp differentiation
between rich and poor countries. Since 1950, population in the former group has
been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per year, and in the latter at 2.0 to 3.5
percent (doubling in 20 to 35 years). Some of the highest rates of increase are
in areas already densely populated and with a weak resource base.
3.
Because of the momentum of population dynamics, reductions in birth rates
affect total numbers only slowly. High birth rates in the recent past have
resulted in a high proportion in the youngest age groups, so that there will
continue to be substantial population increases over many years even if a two-child
family should become the norm in the future. Policies to reduce fertility will
have their main effects on total numbers only after several decades. However,
if future numbers are to be kept within reasonable bounds, it is urgent that
measures to reduce fertility be started and made effective in the 1970's and
1980's. Moreover, programs started now to reduce birth rates will have short
run advantages for developing countries in lowered demands on food, health and
educational and other services and in enlarged capacity to contribute to
productive investments, thus accelerating development.
4.
U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion population of 1970 as a base (there are
nearly 4 billion now) and project from about 6 billion to 8 billion people for
the year 2000 with the U.S. medium estimate at 6.4 billion. The U.S. medium
projections show a world population of 12 billion by 2075 which implies a
five-fold increase in south and southeast Asia and in Latin American and a
seven-fold increase in Africa, compared with a doubling in east Asia and a 40%
increase in the presently developed countries (see Table I). Most
demographers, including the U.N. and the U.S. Population Council, regard the
range of 10 to 13 billion as the most likely level for world population
stability, even with intensive efforts at fertility control. (These figures
assume, that sufficient food could be produced and distributed to avoid
limitation through famines.)
Adequacy
of World Food Supplies
5.
Growing populations will have a serious impact on the need for food especially
in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs. While under normal weather conditions and
assuming food production growth in line with recent trends, total world agricultural
production could expand faster than population, there will nevertheless be
serious problems in food distribution and financing, making shortages, even at
today's poor nutrition levels, probable in many of the larger more populous LDC
regions. Even today 10 to 20 million people die each year due, directly or
indirectly, to malnutrition. Even more serious is the consequence of major crop
failures which are likely to occur from time to time.
6.
The most serious consequence for the short and middle term is the possibility
of massive famines in certain parts of the world, especially the poorest
regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2 percent or more per year (making a
modest allowance for improved diets and nutrition) at a time when readily available
fertilizer and well-watered land is already largely being utilized. Therefore,
additions to food production must come mainly from higher yields. Countries
with large population growth cannot afford constantly growing imports, but for
them to raise food output steadily by 2 to 4 percent over the next generation
or two is a formidable challenge. Capital and foreign exchange requirements for
intensive agriculture are heavy, and are aggravated by energy cost increases
and fertilizer scarcities and price rises. The institutional, technical, and
economic problems of transforming traditional agriculture are also very
difficult to overcome.
7.
In addition, in some overpopulated regions, rapid population growth presses on
a fragile environment in ways that threaten longer-term food production:
through cultivation of marginal lands, overgrazing, desertification,
deforestation, and soil erosion, with consequent destruction of land and
pollution of water, rapid siltation of reservoirs, and impairment of inland and
coastal fisheries.
Minerals
and Fuel
8.
Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in pressure on
depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals), since demand for them
depends more on levels of industrial output than on numbers of people. On the
other hand, the world is increasingly dependent on mineral supplies from
developing countries, and if rapid population frustrates their prospects for
economic development and social progress, the resulting instability may
undermine the conditions for expanded output and sustained flows of such
resources.
9.
There will be serious problems for some of the poorest LDCs with rapid
population growth. They will increasingly find it difficult to pay for needed
raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for their own agricultural
production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few years. Imports for
fuel and other materials will cause grave problems which could impinge on the
U.S., both through the need to supply greater financial support and in LDC
efforts to obtain better terms of trade through higher prices for exports.
Economic
Development and Population Growth
10.
Rapid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of economic development
otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of preventing any increase in per
capita incomes. In addition to the overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid
population growth seriously affects a vast range of other aspects of the
quality of life important to social and economic progress in the LDCs.
11.
Adverse economic factors which generally result from rapid population growth
include:
reduced
family savings and domestic investment;
increased
need for large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
intensification
of severe unemployment and underemployment;
the
need for large expenditures for services such as dependency support, education,
and health which would be used for more productive investment;
the
concentration of developmental resources on increasing food production to ensure
survival for a larger population, rather than on improving living conditions
for smaller total numbers.
12. While GNP
increased per annum at an average rate of 5 percent in LDCs over the last
decade, the population increase of 2.5 percent reduced the average annual per
capita growth rate to only 2.5 percent. In many heavily populated areas this
rate was 2 percent or less. In the LDCs hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an
aggregate population of 800 million, GNP increases may be reduced to less than
1 percent per capita per year for the remainder of the 1970's. For the poorest
half of the populations of these countries, with average incomes of less than
$100, the prospect is for no growth or retrogression for this period.
13.
If significant progress can be made in slowing population growth, the positive
impact on growth of GNP and per capita income will be significant.
Moreover, economic and social progress will probably contribute further to the
decline in fertility rates.
14.
High birth rates appear to stem primarily from:
a.
inadequate information about and availability of means of fertility control;
b.
inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with motivation
for many children resulting from still high infant and child mortality and need
for support in old age; and
c.
the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes in
environment.
15. The
universal objective of increasing the world's standard of living dictates that
economic growth outpace population growth. In many high population growth areas
of the world, the largest proportion of GNP is consumed, with only a small
amount saved. Thus, a small proportion of GNP is available for investment --
the "engine" of economic growth. Most experts agree that, with fairly
constant costs per acceptor, expenditures on effective family planning services
are generally one of the most cost effective investments for an LDC country
seeking to improve overall welfare and per capita economic growth. We cannot
wait for overall modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates
naturally since this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing
countries, during which time rapid population growth will tend to slow
development and widen even more the gap between rich and poor.
16.
The interrelationships between development and population growth are complex
and not wholly understood. Certain aspects of economic development and
modernization appear to be more directly related to lower birth rates than
others. Thus certain development programs may bring a faster demographic
transition to lower fertility rates than other aspects of development. The
World Population Plan of Action adopted at the World Population Conference
recommends that countries working to affect fertility levels should give
priority to development programs and health and education strategies which have
a decisive effect on fertility. International cooperation should give priority
to assisting such national efforts. These programs include: (a) improved health
care and nutrition to reduce child mortality, (b) education and improved social
status for women; (c) increased female employment; (d) improved old-age
security; and (e) assistance for the rural poor, who generally have the highest
fertility, with actions to redistribute income and resources including
providing privately owned farms. However, one cannot proceed simply from
identification of relationships to specific large-scale operational programs.
For example, we do not yet know of cost-effective ways to encourage increased
female employment, particularly if we are concerned about not adding to male
unemployment. We do not yet know what specific packages of programs will be
most cost effective in many situations.
17.
There is need for more information on cost effectiveness of different
approaches on both the "supply" and the "demand" side of
the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts are required to assure full availability
by 1980 of birth control information and means to all fertile individuals,
especially in rural areas. Improvement is also needed in methods of birth
control most acceptable and useable by the rural poor. On the demand side,
further experimentation and implementation action projects and programs are
needed. In particular, more research is needed on the motivation of the poorest
who often have the highest fertility rates. Assistance programs must be more
precisely targeted to this group than in the past.
18.
It may well be that desired family size will not decline to near replacement
levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor improves to the extent that the
benefits of reducing family size appear to them to outweigh the costs. For
urban people, a rapidly growing element in the LDCs, the liabilities of having
too many children are already becoming apparent. Aid recipients and donors must
also emphasize development and improvements in the quality of life of the poor,
if significant progress is to be made in controlling population growth.
Although it was adopted primarily for other reasons, the new emphasis of AID's
legislation on problems of the poor (which is echoed in comparable changes in
policy emphasis by other donors and by an increasing number of LDC's) is
directly relevant to the conditions required for fertility reduction.
Political
Effects of Population Factors
19.
The political consequences of current population factors in the LDCs -- rapid
growth, internal migration, high percentages of young people, slow improvement
in living standards, urban concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration
-- are damaging to the internal stability and international relations of
countries in whose advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating political
or even national security problems for the U.S. In a broader sense, there is a
major risk of severe damage to world economic, political, and ecological
systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian values.
20.
The pace of internal migration from countryside to over-swollen cities is
greatly intensified by rapid population growth. Enormous burdens are placed on
LDC governments for public administration, sanitation, education, police, and
other services, and urban slum dwellers (though apparently not recent migrants)
may serve as a volatile, violent force which threatens political stability.
21.
Adverse socio-economic conditions generated by these and related factors may
contribute to high and increasing levels of child abandonment, juvenile
delinquency, chronic and growing underemployment and unemployment, petty
thievery, organized brigandry, food riots, separatist movements, communal
massacres, revolutionary actions and counter-revolutionary coups. Such
conditions also detract from the environment needed to attract the foreign
capital vital to increasing levels of economic growth in these areas. If these
conditions result in expropriation of foreign interests, such action, from an
economic viewpoint, is not in the best interests of either the investing country
or the host government.
22.
In international relations, population factors are crucial in, and often
determinants of, violent conflicts in developing areas. Conflicts that are
regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic roots. Recognition
of these relationships appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of
such hostilities.
General
Goals and Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth
23.
The central question for world population policy in the year 1974, is whether
mankind is to remain on a track toward an ultimate population of 12 to 15
billion -- implying a five to seven-fold increase in almost all the
underdeveloped world outside of China -- or whether (despite the momentum of
population growth) it can be switched over to the course of earliest feasible
population stability -- implying ultimate totals of 8 to 9 billions and not
more than a three or four-fold increase in any major region.
24.
What are the stakes? We do not know whether technological developments will
make it possible to feed over 8 much less 12 billion people in the 21st
century. We cannot be entirely certain that climatic changes in the coming
decade will not create great difficulties in feeding a growing population,
especially people in the LDCs who live under increasingly marginal and more
vulnerable conditions. There exists at least the possibility that present
developments point toward Malthusian conditions for many regions of the world.
25.
But even if survival for these much larger numbers is possible, it will in all
likelihood be bare survival, with all efforts going in the good years to
provide minimum nutrition and utter dependence in the bad years on emergency
rescue efforts from the less populated and richer countries of the world. In
the shorter run -- between now and the year 2000 -- the difference between the
two courses can be some perceptible material gain in the crowded poor regions,
and some improvement in the relative distribution of intra-country per
capita income between rich and poor, as against permanent poverty and the
widening of income gaps. A much more vigorous effort to slow population growth
can also mean a very great difference between enormous tragedies of
malnutrition and starvation as against only serious chronic conditions.
Policy
Recommendations
26.
There is no single approach which will "solve" the population
problem. The complex social and economic factors involved call for a
comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and multilateral elements. At the
same time actions and programs must be tailored to specific countries and
groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play the most important role to achieve
success.
27.
Coordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral organizations is vital
to any effort to moderate population growth. Each kind of effort will be needed
for worldwide results.
28.
World policy and programs in the population field should incorporate two major
objectives:
(a)
actions to accommodate continued population growth up to 6 billions by the
mid-21st century without massive starvation or total frustration of
developmental hopes; and
(b)
actions to keep the ultimate level as close as possible to 8 billions rather
than permitting it to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or more.
29. While
specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim should be for the
world to achieve a replacement level of fertility, (a two-child family on the
average), by about the year 2000. This will require the present 2 percent
growth rate to decline to 1.7 percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by
2000. Compared to the U.N medium projection, this goal would result in 500
million fewer people in 2000 and about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of
this goal will require greatly intensified population programs. A basis for
developing national population growth control targets to achieve this world
target is contained in the World Population Plan of Action.
30.
The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and will require
vigorous efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies and other international
bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership is essential. The strategy must
include the following elements and actions:
(a) Concentration
on key countries. Assistance for population moderation should give primary
emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there is
special U.S. political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Colombia. Together, they account for 47
percent of the world's current population increase. (It should be recognized
that at present AID bilateral assistance to some of these countries may not be
acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent that funds are available, will
be given to other countries, considering such factors as population growth,
need for external assistance, long-term U.S. interests and willingness to
engage in self-help. Multilateral programs must necessarily have a wider
coverage and the bilateral programs of other national donors will be shaped to
their particular interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the
multilateral agencies -- especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities
which already has projects in over 80 countries -- to increase population
assistance on a broader basis with increased U.S. contributions. This is
desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political terms in the
United Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key 13 and our
limited resources should give major emphasis to them. (b) Integration of
population factors and population programs into country development planning.
As called for by the world Population Plan of Action, developing countries and
those aiding them should specifically take population factors into account in
national planning and include population programs in such plans. (c) Increased
assistance for family planning services, information and technology. This
is a vital aspect of any world population program. (1) Family planning
information and materials based on present technology should be made fully
available as rapidly as possible to the 85% of the populations in key LDCs not
now reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest fertility. (2)
Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed at simple,
low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods of fertility
control. Support by all federal agencies for biomedical research in this field
should be increased by $60 million annually. (d) Creating conditions
conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent with the
recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, priority should be
given in the general aid program to selective development policies in sectors
offering the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller family size.
In many cases pilot programs and experimental research will be needed as
guidance for later efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
Providing
minimal levels of education, especially for women;
Reducing
infant mortality, including through simple low-cost health care networks;
Expanding
wage employment, especially for women;
Developing
alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
Increasing
income of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including providing privately
owned farms;
Education
of new generations on the desirability of smaller families.
While
AID has information on the relative importance of the new major socio-economic
factors that lead to lower birth rates, much more research and experimentation
need to be done to determine what cost effective programs and policy will lead
to lower birth rates.
(e) Food
and agricultural assistance is vital for any population sensitive development
strategy. The provision of adequate food stocks for a growing population
in times of shortage is crucial. Without such a program for the LDCs there is
considerable chance that such shortage will lead to conflict and adversely
affect population goals and developmental efforts. Specific recommendations are
included in Section IV(c) of this study. (f) Development of a worldwide
political and popular commitment to population stabilization is fundamental to
any effective strategy. This requires the support and commitment of key
LDC leaders. This will only take place if they clearly see the negative impact
of unrestricted population growth and believe it is possible to deal with this
question through governmental action. The U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to
take the lead in advancing family planning and population stabilization both
within multilateral organizations and through bilateral contacts with other
LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of State treat the
subject of population growth control as a matter of paramount importance and
address it specifically in their regular contacts with leaders of other
governments, particularly LDCs.
31.
The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions adopted by consensus by
137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World Population Conference, though not
ideal, provide an excellent framework for developing a worldwide system of
population/family planning programs. We should use them to generate U.N. agency
and national leadership for an all-out effort to lower growth rates.
Constructive action by the U.S. will further our objectives. To this end we
should:
(a)
Strongly support the World Population Plan of Action and the adoption of its
appropriate provisions in national and other programs. (b) Urge the adoption by
national programs of specific population goals including replacement levels of
fertility for DCs and LDCs by 2000. (c) After suitable preparation in the U.S.,
announce a U.S. goal to maintain our present national average fertility no
higher than replacement level and attain near stability by 2000. (d) Initiate
an international cooperative strategy of national research programs on human
reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and socio-economic
factors, as proposed by the U.S. Delegation at Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer
at Bucharest to collaborate with other interested donors and U.N. agencies to
aid selected countries to develop low cost preventive health and family
planning services. (f) Work directly with donor countries and through the U.N.
Fund for Population Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and
multilateral assistance for population programs.
32. As measures
to increase understanding of population factors by LDC leaders and to
strengthen population planning in national development plans, we should carry
out the recommendations in Part II, Section VI, including:
(a)
Consideration of population factors and population policies in all Country
Assistance Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance Program (DAP)
multi-year strategy papers.
(b)
Prepare projections of population growth individualized for countries with
analyses of development of each country and discuss them with national leaders.
(c)
Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior officials of LDCs in
the elements of demographic economics.
(d)
Arrange for familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for
ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and comparably
influential leaders from private life.
(e)
Assure assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors in national
plans, particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural
resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and
social stability.
(f)
Also assure assistance to LDC leaders in relating population policies and
family planning programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition,
agriculture, education, social services, organized labor, women's activities,
and community development.
(g)
Undertake initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding improvement in
the status of women.
(h)
Give emphasis in assistance to programs on development of rural areas.
Beyond these activities which are
essentially directed at national interests, we must assure that a broader
educational concept is developed to convey an acute understanding to national
leaders of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth.
33.
We must take care that our activities should not give the appearance to the
LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed against the LDCs.
Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this field we support in the
LDCs are ones we can support within this country. "Third World"
leaders should be in the forefront and obtain the credit for successful
programs. In this context it is important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that
such family planning programs have worked and can work within a reasonable
period of time.
34.
To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our emphasis on the
right of individuals and couples to determine freely and responsibly the number
and spacing of their children and to have information, education and means to
do so, and our continued interest in improving the overall general welfare. We
should use the authority provided by the World Population Plan of Action to
advance the principles that 1) responsibility in parenthood includes responsibility
to the children and the community and 2) that nations in exercising their
sovereignty to set population policies should take into account the welfare of
their neighbors and the world. To strengthen the worldwide approach, family
planning programs should be supported by multilateral organizations wherever
they can provide the most efficient means.
35.
To support such family planning and related development assistance efforts
there is need to increase public and leadership information in this field. We
recommend increased emphasis on mass media, newer communications technology and
other population education and motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher
priority should be given to these information programs in this field worldwide.
36.
In order to provide the necessary resources and leadership, support by the U.S.
public and Congress will be necessary. A significant amount of funds will be
required for a number of years. High level personal contact by the Secretary of
State and other officials on the subject at an early date with Congressional
counterparts is needed. A program for this purpose should be developed by OES
with H and AID.
37.
There is an alternate view which holds that a growing number of
experts believe that the population situation is already more serious and less
amenable to solution through voluntary measures than is generally accepted. It
holds that, to prevent even more widespread food shortage and other demographic
catastrophes than are generally anticipated, even stronger measures are
required and some fundamental, very difficult moral issues need to be
addressed. These include, for example, our own consumption patterns, mandatory
programs, tight control of our food resources. In view of the seriousness of
these issues, explicit consideration of them should begin in the Executive
Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I for this
viewpoint.)
38.
Implementing the actions discussed above (in paragraphs 1-36), will require a
significant expansion in AID funds for population/family planning. A number of
major actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility decline can be
funded from resources available to the sectors in question (e.g., education,
agriculture). Other actions, including family planning services, research and
experimental activities on factors affecting fertility, come under population
funds. We recommend increases in AID budget requests to the Congress on the
order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million
requested for FY 1975). This funding would cover both bilateral programs and
contributions to multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed
in the future could change significantly, depending on such factors as major
breakthroughs in fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to
population assistance. To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded
actions discussed above, AID is likely to need additional direct hire personnel
in the population/family planning area. As a corollary to expanded AID funding
levels for population, efforts must be made to encourage increased
contributions by other donors and recipient countries to help reduce rapid
population growth.
Policy
Follow-up and Coordination
39.
This world wide population strategy involves very complex and difficult
questions. Its implementation will require very careful coordination and
specific application in individual circumstances. Further work is greatly
needed in examining the mix of our assistance strategy and its most efficient
application. A number of agencies are interested and involved. Given this,
there appears to be a need for a better and higher level mechanism to refine
and develop policy in this field and to coordinate its implementation beyond
this NSSM. The following options are suggested for consideration: (a) That the
NSC Under Secretaries Committee be given responsibility for policy and
executive review of this subject:
Pros:
Because
of the major foreign policy implications of the recommended population strategy
a high level focus on policy is required for the success of such a major
effort.
With
the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need for an accepted and
normal interagency process for effective analysis and disinterested policy
development and implementation within the N.S.C. system.
Staffing
support for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists within the USC
framework including utilization of the Office of Population of the Department
of State as well as other.
USC
has provided coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy areas involving
a number of agencies as is the case in this study.
Cons:
The
USC would not be within the normal policy-making framework for development
policy as would be in the case with the DCC.
The
USC is further removed from the process of budget development and review of the
AID Population Assistance program.
(b) That when its establishment is
authorized by the President, the Development Coordination Committee, headed by
the AID Administrator be given overall responsibility:*
Pros:
(Provided by AID)
It is
precisely for coordination of this type of development issue involving a variety
of U.S. policies toward LDCs that the Congress directed the establishment of
the DCC.
The
DCC is also the body best able to relate population issues to other development
issues, with which they are intimately related.
The
DCC has the advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects of U.S.
population policies, thereby minimizing political complications frequently
inherent in population programs.
It
is, in AID's view, the coordinating body best located to take an overview of
all the population activities now taking place under bilateral and multilateral
auspices.
Cons:
While
the DCC will doubtless have substantial technical competence, the entire range
of political and other factors bearing on our global population strategy might
be more effectively considered by a group having a broader focus than the DCC.
The
DCC is not within the N.S.C. system which provides a more direct access to both
the President and the principal foreign policy decision-making mechanism.
The
DCC might overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of population and under
emphasize other important elements.
(c) That
the NSC/CIEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this subject to
insure follow-up interagency coordination, and further policy development.
(No participating Agency supports this option, therefore it is only included to
present a full range of possibilities). Option (a) is supported by State,
Treasury,
Defense (ISA and JCS), Agriculture, HEW,
Commerce NSC and CIA.**
Option
(b) is supported by AID.
Under
any of the above options, there should be an annual review of our population
policy to examine progress, insure our programs are in keeping with the latest
information in this field, identify possible deficiencies, and recommend
additional action at the appropriate level.***
* NOTE: AID expects the DCC will have the following
composition: The Administrator of AID as Chairman; the Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs; the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs; the
Under Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and Labor; an Associate Director of
OMB; the Executive Director of CIEP, STR; a representative of the NSC; the
Presidents of the EX-IM Bank and OPIC; and any other agency when items of
interest to them are under discussion.)
** Department of
Commerce supports the option of placing the population policy formulation
mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes that any detailed economic
questions resulting from proposed population policies be explored through
existing domestic and international economic policy channels.
*** AID believes these
reviews undertaken only periodically might look at selected areas or at the
entire range of population policy depending on problems and needs which arise.
Full
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